Advocate in Chandigarh It provides that where the assured assigns or otherwise parts with his interest in the subject-matter insured, he (insured) does not thereby transfer to the assignee his rights under the contract of insurance unless there is an express or implied agreement with the assignee to that effect. 403(1) but for a distinct offence as contemplated by sub-section (2). Nor is it easy to reconcile all the decisions that were cited before us for each case has been decided on its peculiar facts.
23) Section 17 deals with “assignment of interest”. Being aggrieved, the appellant is before us. In the first place, they have relied on what may be said to be an abstract proposition of law, that prohibition with a view to State monopoly is not per se unreasonable. Each group consists of a number of classes of posts and in each class there are a number of posts. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a; complete answer to the contention because the appall ants were not tried for the same offence as contemplated under s.
It is pointed out that the preamble to the Act indicates that the legislation was’ passed in the interests of the general public who are undoubtedly interested Advocate in Chandigarh a suitable and efficient road transport service, and it was\ not proved by the petitioners that the monopoly, which was contemplated in favour of the State Advocates in Chandigarh regard to this particular business, was not conducive to the common welfare. 725 the restrictions are reasonable or not would depend to a large extent on the nature of the trade and the conditions prevalent in it.
They are as follows :- Certain posts were identified by the Government of India vide notification No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. 237 was applicable and that sub-section (2) of s. D14 and D23, it cannot be held that the share of plaintiffs No. However, the rights of the State and Chandigarh Advocates its agencies and instrumentalities in the realm of contracts are circumscribed by the considerations of public interest. Affirming the judgment of the trial court, High Court held that in the absence of any conveyance deed, on the basis of Exs.
“In my opinion”, thus observes one of the learned Judges, “even this total stoppage of trade on public places and thoroughfares cannot always be said to be an unreasonable restriction”. As a proposition of law, the first ground may not admit of any dispute but we think that the observations of Lord Porter in the Privy Council case of Commonwealth of Australia and Others v. After such identification, the appropriate Government is mandated under Section 33 to reserve not less than three per cent of IDENTIFIED POSTS in favour of PWD.
” It is not easy to define the term ‘capital expenditure’ in the abstract or to lay down any general and satisfactory test to discriminate between a capital and a revenue expenditure. Being aggrieved, the defendant preferred appeal before the High Court in R. 2007 (hereinafter, NOTIFICATION) as posts suitable for being filled up with PWD (hereinafter IDENTIFIED POSTS); an exercise in compliance with the mandate under Section 32 of the 1995 Act. 3 is concerned, High Court held that the patta was granted in favour of the defendant after filing of the suit and the defendant has failed to prove his independent income to pay the amount for grant of land and on those findings dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant.
Some broad principles can, however, be deduced from what the learned Judges have laid down from time to time. There in nothing wrong in the nature of the trade before us, which is perfectly innocuous. In the second place, it has been said that the transport services are essential to the life of the community and it is conducive to the interests of the general public to have an efficient system of transport on public roads. Apart from such general principle, the rights and obligations of the parties to the PPA in question are also subject to certain statutory prescriptions.
The learned Judges of the High Court have upheld the validity of the legislation substantially on two grounds. Bank of New South Wales and Others (1) upon which considerable reliance has been placed by the High Court would indicate the proper way of approach to this question’ “Their Lordships do not intend to lay it down”, thus observed Lord Porter, “that in no circumstances could the exclusion of competition so as to create a monopoly either in a State or Commonwealth agency or in some other body be justified.
The dispute in this appeal relates to the assessment of the profits of the Company for income-tax for the periods, 1943-1944, 1944-1945, 1945-1946 and 1946-1947. Advocates Chandigarh -This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta on a reference under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act. Its business consists exclusively in granting terminable pensions or annuities dependent on human life in favour of the subscribers or their nominees. 3 and 4 is transferred to the defendant.
The appellant is a Company which came into existence in 1870 as an unregistered association, and in 1906 it was registered under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act.