The draftsman of this section has apparently attempted to remedy whatever defects in the classification made under section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 had been pointed out during the discussion in Advocate in Chandigarh Suraj Mal Mohta’s case Advocate in Chandigarh this Court. In the present case, we are of opinion that the facts disclosed do not warrant Chandigarh Advocates an inference of common intention in Pandurang’s case. However, if medical opinion holds, for reasons to be stated, that the disease could not have been detected on medical examination prior to acceptance for service, the disease will not be deemed to have arisen during service.
Section 61 deals with the former, and section 64 with the latter. There is no substance in the contention that section 61 of the Act provides for presentment for acceptance only when the bill is payable after sight, and not when it is payable on demand. But when the bill is payable on demand both the stages synchronise and there is only one presentment, which is both for acceptance and for payment and therefore the person who is entitled to receive the payment under section 78 of the Act is the person who is entitled to present it for acceptance.
By that Judgment and Order the High Court held that the circular order No. In a bill payable after sight, there are two distinct stages, 504 firstly when it is presented for acceptance, and later when it is presented for payment. (b) A disease which has led to an individuals discharge or death will ordinarily be deemed to have arisen in service, if no note of it was made at the time of the individuals acceptance for military service.
Nachiappa Gounden (46 I. 1), The Collector of Masulipatam v. Presentment for acceptance must always and in every case precede presentment for payment. The Act has inserted the following sub- section in section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act : As regards the first contention canvassed by the learned Attorney-General it seems to us that it cannot stand scrutiny. SSN 2054(a) issued by the State of Bombay, Education Department, on the 6th January, 1954, was bad in that it contravened the provisions of article 29(2) and article 337 and directed the issue of a Lawyer in Chandigarh writ prohibiting the State from enforcing the order against the authorities of Barnes High School established and run by the Education Society of Bombay (hereinafter referred as the Society).
The contention of the appellant is that Act No. -These three appeals, filed by the State of Bombay, with a certificate granted by the Bombay High Court, are directed against the Judgment and Order pronounced by that High Court on the 15th February, 1954, on three Civil Applications under article 226. Such restriction would be a reasonable one to impose in the interests of the general public for the preservation of purity in public life.
Assuming that evasion of tax to a substantial amount “could form a basis of classification at all for imposing a drastic procedure on that class, the inclusion of only such of them whose cases had been referred before 1st September, 1948, into a class for being dealt with by the drastic procedure, leaving other tax evaders 796 to be dealt with under the ordinary law will be a clear discrimination for the reference of the case within a particular time has no special or rational nexus with the necessity for drastic procedure.
Pandurang is accordingly only liable for what he actually did. The language employed here bears close likeness to that employed in section 5(1) of the impugned Act. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS J. XLIII of 1951 being a law made by Parliament, the disqualifications laid down under section 7 therein would fall within article 102(1)(e)’ and would under section 17 of Act No. Further it seems that this very class of persons is now included within the ambit of the amended section 34 of Act XXXIII of 1954.
n721), Rangasami Gounden v. The class of persons alleged to have been dealt with by section 5(1) of the impugned Act was comprised of those unsocial elements in society who during recent years prior to the passing of the Act had madesubstantial profits and had evaded payment of tax on those profits those cases were referred to the Investigation Commission before 1st September, 1948. 1097 similarity of the facts Advocate in Chandigarh one case cannot be used to determine a conclusion of fact in another.
529) and Hunoomanpersaud Pandey v. Therefore, even if that had been charged, no conviction could have followed on that basis. We therefore see no substance in this contention of the appellant also. Musammat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (6 M. XLIX Of 1951 be attracted to elections held under that Act, 553 The respondent attempted several answers to this contention. The preamble of the Act states that the Act is intended to provide for assessment or reassessment of persons who to a substantial extent had evaded payment of tax during a certain period and for matters connected therewith.
Even if it be taken as a restriction on his right to practice his profession of law, such restriction would be a reasonable one and well within the ambit of article 19 clause 5.