The appellants contested their summoning before the trial Court by asserting, that their prosecution was unsustainable in law, because no sanction had been obtained by the prosecution under Section 197 of the Code, before cognizance was taken against them. The aforesaid application was allowed by the trial Court, on 06. ” It was contended before the High Court that this was an Act in respect of which a certificate could have been obtained from the President under clause (6) of article 31 of the Constitution in order to secure immunity from the challenge of unconstitutionality but since that has not been done, the liability to its challenge with reference to the alleged violation of section 299 of the Government of India Act remains.
Thereupon, the appellants were summoned by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala, to face trial. More particularly, when the 2nd respondent succeeded before two fora below, the concession of the 2nd respondent to pay compensatory tariff to the appellant though said to be subject to the contentions of the respondent in the appeal is nothing but largesse of the State to the appellant and not consistent with public interest. In exercise of powers conferred on it by section 4 of the 1946 Ordinance the Government of India, on the 21st October, 1946, made the notified order No.
It is not a matter of dispute, that after the statements of three prosecution witnesses were recorded by the trial Court, Usha Rani moved an application under Section 319 of the Code before the trial Judge ” the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala, for taking cognizance against the appellants herein. He further submitted that this Court may not affix a stamp of approval for such a decision of the 2nd respondent by passing any order accepting the concession made by the respondent.
(2) Neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land, or any commercial or industrial undertaking or any interest Lawyers in Chandigarh, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, unless the law provides for the payment of compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which and the manner in which, it is to be determined.
A distinction is sought to be made by the learned counsel between an “existing law” as defined in article 366(10) and a “law in force” and it is argued that though an “order” can come within the Advocates Chandigarh definition 746 of “existing law”, it cannot be included within the expression “law in force” as used in article 372. (emphasis is ours) The learned senior counsel highlighted, that sanction under Section 197 of the Code is mandatory, where the concerned public servant is alleged to have committed an offence while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty.
Chatterjee argues that article 372 has no application to the present case inasmuch as the order made by the Central Government under section 94(3) of the Government of India Act could not be regarded as “a law Lawyers in Chandigarh force” within the meaning of article 372. It is argued next that even if the word “law” is wide enough to include an order, that order must be a legislative and not a mere executive order promulgated by an administrative authority, and in support of this contention the learned counsel has relied on a number of cases decided by the Privy Council and the different High Courts Lawyer in Chandigarh India.
The learned Judges of the High Court without going into the question whether or not under any of the 89 694 provisions of the present Constitution this piece of legislation was immune from attack of the kind put forward, dealt with the merits of the challenge and held that the Act was for a public purpose and that the compensation provided was neither illusory nor unfair and that accordingly there was no violation of the provisions of section 299 of the Government of India Act.
He also submitted that the payment of compensatory tariff to the appellant would ultimately result in compelling the consumers to pay higher price. (ii) The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 42 provides that if such officer has reasons to believe, he may carry the search after recording the grounds of belief whereas no ground of belief as contemplated by the proviso was recorded in the present case and search took place after sun set which violates the provisions of Section 42(2) proviso.
603(2)-IIl(1) directing that the powers conferred on it by section 3(1) of that Ordinance should, in relation to foodstuffs, be exercisable also by any Provincial Government, subject to certain conditions therein set out. XXX XXX XXX (4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held.